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PREFACE 
Without conceding or minimizing the importance of the 
specified points set forth in the argument in their prior 
Brief, plaintiffs Baxter feel that a Reply Brief is both 
necessary and helpful in addressing certain new matters which 
have arisen since their prior Brief was prepared and filed 
and to summarize the posture of this litigation for the pur-
pose of condensing the basic issues to be decided on this 
Appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANT UDOT SEEKS TO CIRCUMVENT THE BASIC ISSUE IN 
THIS CASE AND ITS BURDEN OF PROOF IN RESPECT THERETO. 
Both during the trial ot this matter and in its Brief 
submitted in support of its position on appeal, defendant Utah 
Department of Transportation has limited its presentation of 
factual matters and applicable law to the narrow issue of 
establishing the location of the "main channel11 of the Weber 
River as it existed in 1866. Its argument proceeds with a 
contention that when the counties were created in 1866 an 
"exact location of the Weber River" could not be determined 
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and, accordingly, there was no "legal11 description of the bound-
ary between Davis and Weber Counties until the course of the 
Weber River was surveyed in 1894. Based on the foregoing, UDOT 
claims that it should prevail. 
On page 14 of UDOTfs Brief, excerpted testimony of its 
expert witnesses reveal questions by its counsel designed to 
elicit responses limited to (a) an "opinion" that he was uncertain 
as to which of three different river channels existing at times 
between 1855 and 1886 might have been the "main channel" of the 
river, and (b) that there was no "legal" description of the course 
of the Weber River in the subject area when the respective counties 
were created on January 10,1866. 
UD0T!s expert witnesses were restricting their version of a 
"legal" description to refer to a metes-and-bounds description, 
since the legislature of the Territory of Utah marked the di-
viding line between the two counties as being "the centre of the 
channel of the Weber River due north from the northwest corner of 
Kingston1s Fort"-- a very adequate legal description. However, 
the same witnesses, together with plaintiff Ronald L. Baxter, all 
testified &s set forth on pages 20 through 22 of plaintiffs1 prior 
Brief) that, during the course of three official U.S. government 
surveys in 1855, 1871 and 1886, the entire flow of the Weber River 
in each year was located north of the subject property and, further, 
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the governnionl suivt »,",
 f».ivi n <"<i"« -*» '«>., i II<H i here were then-
existing dry channels located -.-._.. JI those indicated 
mi llit mi especI it'i sunn v . whh h nn have ever served as 
river channels. 
I ^idence established that there was 4~ £act - main 
channel wf the k c u d River <*<_ tue LJLII 
survey*?, 1ocated approximately 600 feet north or the subject 
property n . i u o - *S. 
P-17 and D-] A , D-l 5 and D-16. 
It si: 1 :)""i in..,II • I be obv 1 oi is • " argument 
has no relevancy and that the *ssue becomes moot once ^L is 
establ Lshetf Ihril. .ill ml I he water oi the Weber River at the 
time of all three surveys-- which of necessity enconipasseci any 
.IDU M I 1 channels which the Weber River may have had at those 
respective times-- were located north el n he suhjert pmpiiLy. 
UDOT vMf" ~~ ~~ evidence, nnr has it ever raised an argument 
either at triaJ r i I I ^ Krii *' -'ivii suggest, in?-, that, I. her*- was 
a "channel11 of the river-- dry : otherwise-- on the south 
side 
fr basic issue In this litigation is moot: 'Where \ /as the 
espect to the Weber River in 
1866? The answer is clearly that was on the south (Davis 
entire Weber River system; and whether the 
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Weber River then had one, two or three channels, or which of 
two or more channels might have then been the f,main channel11 
of the River, presents an "issue" of no consequence. 
It is obvious that, after official U.S. government surveys 
in 1855, 1871 and 1886 all located the Weber River to the north 
of the subject property, the sudden appearance sometime after 
1886 of a well-defined single channel on the south side of the 
subject property carrying all of the riverfs water, supports the 
testimony of Earl Kendell that an up-stream diversion dike, con-
structed about 1890, diverted the river in a southwesterly direct-
. 1 ion. 
UDOT suggests in its Brief (p.20) that the rock wall diversion 
structure was built when highway-construction work was undertaken 
(in 1927), presumably by the State Road Commission, but that argu-
ment-- now surfacing for the first time-- is based upon a claimed 
interpretation °f the 1927 highway plans by its witness DeMass. 
(See Exh. D-25 or Exh. P-18—both are the same) 
The 1927 highway construction certainly intersected the old 
rock wall at its northeast extremity so as to permit realignment 
of the prior highway which existed in the general area, and which 
curved around a bend of the river in a northerly direction. In the 
#
 Mr. Kendell related the information as given to him by his grand-
father, admissible evidence under Rule 803 (20) and (24), Utah 
Rules of Evidence. 
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process, the 1927 plans called for a channel change some 
distance to the east of the existing rock wall, which was 
shown on the highway-design map as a then-existing structure, 
so as to straighten and replace the older road. But there is 
no other channel change shown except fur the short distance 
indicated on the plans; further, if the rock wall was not in 
existence prior to the 1927 construction, the 1927 plans, under 
the "List of Structures," certainly would have detailed its 
width and length, and the size of the rocks to be used, for 
bidding purposes, as well as indicating its association with a 
channel change. 
Counsel for UDOT claims the rock wall was built to prevent 
erosion of the "new highway" constructed in 1927, but the first 
full paragraph on page 20 of UD0Tfs Brief is absolutely wrong--
as counsel should know! A careful reading of the testimony of 
DeMass 1 direct examination (R. 786-767) gives no support for 
that claim since he stated that the 1927 plans only involved 
-,
1
 «ew alignment and a reconstruction of an older existing road 
at that point: 
Q. (By Mr. Ward) And what's the purpose of these proposed 
plans on D25, if you know? 
A, Well, it's an alignment and a reconstruction of a 
portion of that particular roadway in that area. 
(R. 766) 
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As to the purpose served by the rock wall, Mr. DaMass 
admitted that it was a dike designed to control the direction 
of the riverfs flow: 
A. (DeMass) Well, and again you're getting-- a dam and a 
dike are two different animals. A dam is to,in fact, 
dam or block the water, which would run as previously 
testified, perpendicular to the stream to back it up. 
A diking situation, a dike would control the water as 
far as direction goes. 
Q. (lir. Ward) Itfs then your opinion this rock wall was 
constructed for the purpose of preventing erosion to 
the highway? 
A. I would think so. It!s exactly in the area where it 
should be. 
(Underlining added) 
(R.767-768) 
However, on cross-examination of DeMass it was made clear 
that the 1927 highway work simply modified an older road problem 
area and that the rock wall diversion facility was in existence 
long before 1927-- exactly as Mr. Kendell testified from his 
knowledge and the information related to him by his grandfather: 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. FULLER: 
Q. Are you suggesting, Mr. DeMass, that the rock wall shown 
on Exhibit 25 might have been built as part of a high-
way project years ago? 
A. I don't know who built the wall. The wall was in place 
. when these plans were developed. 
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Q. i see. So that when these plans were developed, the 
rock wall was there, and the irrigation ditch was 
taken out of the rock wall, apparently? 
A. Apparently, from what the plans are, thatfs exactly 
correct. 
0. And as you read these plans, there was-- at the time 
the plans were being built in contemplation of a 
channel change, there was a road around the north 
side? 
A. Thatfs correct. 
Q. And have you any idea how old that road would have 
been? 
A. No, I donft. That road has been there forever. 
Q. But it was there in 19, what, f27? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would it be a logical assumption that when the road 
was built and it had a bow in it, then it was 
intending to go around to the north of the existing 
rock wall and the location of the river as it then 
existed? 
A, Yes. 
Q. So whenever that road was built years ago, it had 
to go around that area, didn't it? 
A. Right. In that particular area, you1re very narrow 
as far as the topography goes. You got the rail-
road, you got a highway and you got the river and 
no room. So all three of them are jammed together 
in that particular area. 
(Underlining added) 
(R. 768-769) 
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Shifting to UDOTfs necessity-for-a- survey defense, its 
position is summarized in an excerpt taken from Mr. Wardfs 
argument at the conclusion of the trial: 
Itfs our position at this point, Your Honor, that those 
counties consisted of what the 1894 survey said they 
consisted of. And so when you consider that along with the 
1894 survey, at the time of statehood, they adopted the 
counties as they now existed and were surveyed. There 
has been absolutely no testimony present, Your Honor, 
that would show a survey prior to 1894 of the Weber River 
itself. 
(Underlining added) 
(R. 784) 
There is no law which mandates that all established county 
boundaries must be surveyed-- and the Utah cases cited in 
plaintiffs1 prior Brief recognize the existence of many county 
boundary lines tied to natural or artificial objects, such as 
rivers, roads, mountain divides and railroads. 
It is unfortunate that Judge Hyde chose to adopt the view 
that there could be no boundary between the two counties until 
the river had been surveyed, since intervening property rights 
could thereby have been destroyed in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (since the survey, if 
recognized in 1894 by the respective counties, would have been 
subject to federal law by virtue of the Organic Act which 
established the Territory of Utah) or the Fourteenth Amend-
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ment to the U. S. Constitution-- and the Federal civil 
Rights Act tied thereto (42 U.S.C. # 1983)-- if such rights, 
as plaintiffs now have, are presently being destroyed by the 
Utah court system and the actions of the State of Utah through 
its agencies, its subdivisions, and elected and/or appointed 
officials. 
And how would UDOT adapt its "position11 if, in this or 
any other similar situation, no survey of the river had taken 
place until 1920, or 1960, or not at all? 
The fact that the Weber River was flowing in a new 
channel in 1894, and that a metes-and-bounds description was 
made at that time showing the location of the then channel of 
the river, is completely subordinate to the basic issue of the 
relative locations of the Weber River and the subject property 
as of January 10, 1866. 
UDOT devotes a single page in its Brief (p. 18) "admit-
ting11 that it was charged with the fl. . .burden of proving the 
location of the property in question...11 in 1866, as mandated 
by Judge Roth and as supported by legal authorities and case 
law, but it advances the defense that it had "apparently11 met 
its burden of proof since the lower Court ruled that the exact 
location of the Weber River in 1866 could not be determined. 
The novel argument is patently absurd on its face since it 
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would not require UDOT to prove anything and, as UDOT would 
view the situation, it could prevail by presumably creating an 
uncertainty on a side issue which was and is entirely beyond 
the basic issue of this litigation. Taken literally, the argu-
ment raised in its Brief would actually place the burden of 
proof on plaintiffs to prove the location of the subject property 
with respect to the location of the Weber River in 1866 and 
UDOT could adroitly tiptoe around Judge Rothfs ruling. 
The irony of this litigation lies in the fact that UDOT, 
while acknowledging that it had the burden of proof, made no 
attempt to meet its burden; on the other hand, plaintiffs who were 
not required to carry the burden of proof, introduced and elicited 
evidence at trial clearly establishing facts necessary to estab-
lish their version of the basic issue in this litigation and to 
rebut any relevant "evidence11 which UDOT might have advanced. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS DENIED ACCESS TO OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERN-
MENT SURVEY MAPS WHICH FURNISHED ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE THAT THE 
WEBER RIVER WAS LOCATED NORTH OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IN 1866. 
Included in plaintiffs1 prior Brief are reproductions of 
official U.S. government plat maps made at the time ofJand in 
conjunction with, the 1855, 1871 and 1886 U.S. government survey 
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notes— Exhibits D-14, D-15 and D-16. Juxtaposed on each 
of the enlarged Exhibits in plaintiffs1 Brief is the 
location of the subject property, placed according to scale. 
The Exhibits all clearly show that in every year when the 
government surveys were taken the entire Weber River flow was 
on the north side of the subject property, placing it in Davis 
County as of 1866. 
Realizing the importance of the Exhibits, both standing 
alone and when considered with other evidence, UDOT filed a 
Motion to Strike the Exhibits with the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah on February 24, 1987, and as grounds for the 
Motion UDOT claimed they had never been received in evidence. 
After submitting briefs and affidavits, this Court remanded 
the matter to Judge Hyde for the purpose of determining whether 
the judge in fact received the Exhibits in question in evidence, 
and, if so, whether the judge had them before him for the pur-
pose of making his decision. 
A hearing on Remand was held before Judge Hyde on May 22, 
1987, and it developed that all three Exhibits had been used by 
defendant UDOT during the course of trial without objection by 
plaintiffs, that at the conclusion of the trial the Exhibits 
were received in evidence with the concurrence of both counsel, 
and that Judge Hyde did not have them during the time he had 
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the case under advisement from August 27, 1986 to September 5, 
1986-- 9 days. The Clerk1s Exhibit Sheet (Addendum I) clearly 
reflects that all three Exhibits were both offered and received. 
Excerpts from the proceedings before Judge Hyde on Remand 
follow: 
THE COURT: Itfs not uncommon for my Clerk to go over with 
Counsel and determine which ones were meant to be 
admitted and which ones were skipped. 
MR. WARD: There is no OK there. 
MR. FULLER: Well I donft know what the OK means, but it 
says they are offered and it says they are received. 
(R. 581 ) 
THE CLERK: 14, 15 and 16, they were offered and received. 
I had them at one time, and when I gathered every-
thing up for the Judge, they were gone. The OK is not 
there. The OK means that the exhibits were in. They 
should have been in. Somebody walked off with 14, 15 
and 16. I walked into the Judge and said, I've got 
exhibits missing, they walked out with them. 
MR. FULLER: So this is what the OK refers to? 
THE CLERK: The OK means the exhibits were all there for the 
Judge, that they were there and together. Somebody 
walked out with the Defendant!s 14, 15 and 16, and the 
Judge was told that. They were not there for him to use 
because an attorney walked out the door with them. 
MR. WARD: Well, that was me,... 
(R. 583 ) 
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Both sides submitted to Judge Hyde their proposed 
documents of Ruling on Order of Remand. Plaintiffs submitted 
a ffYes11 to the question of whether the three Exhibits were 
received in evidence, but a "No" to the question of whether 
Judge Hyde had the Exhibits before him for the purpose of 
making his decision. On the other hand, counsel for UDOT 
prepared a Ruling on Order of Remand, which Judge Hyde signed, 
giving a qualified "Yes11 response to both portions of the 
questions submitted by this Court. 
Judge Hyde stated that he looked at the disputed Exhibits 
with the following comments made during the Remand hearing : 
THE COURT: Well, if they were utilized during the 
questioning of witnesses, I certainly 
looked at them. 
(R. 582 ) 
THE COURT: They were not taken into chambers. I 
recall seeing them. I can remember them to 
that extent. 
(R. 585 ) 
As a matter of fact, Judge Hyde only saw the field notes 
of the U.S. Survey for each of the three years involved since 
those Exhibits (P-15, P-16 and P-17) were offered as 
Exhibits by plaintiffs in the regular manner and they were 
received in open court by him. Conversely, Counsel for UDOT 
had Exhibits D-14, D-15 and D-16 numbered and marked in advance 
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by the Clerk with numerous other proposed Exhibits. Counsel for 
UDOT used the disputed Exhibits in the interrogation of his 
witness, John Reeve. Since those Exhibits were a part of the 
official U.S. Survey from which the field notes were taken, and 
would have been subsequently offered by plaintiffs, there was no 
objection by plaintiffs to the use of those Exhibits in the inter-
rogation of Mr. Reeve during the course of UDOTfs presentation of 
its case. However, since those three Exhibits were not offered in 
open court by Mr. Ward, and handed up to the Judge for his inspec-
tion as is customary procedure, Judge Hyde actually never saw the 
three Exhibits. The transcript of the testimony of witness John 
Reeve, on direct examination by Mr. Ward, is devoid of any indica-
tion that Judge Hyde saw, or likely would have seen, the three 
Exhibits; he only saw Exhibits P-15, P-16 and P-17 (field notes taken 
as part of the official U.S. surveys) and other Exhibits (R. 625-
626) prepared from the field notes. 
What is abundantly clear, however, is that, during the course 
of the nine days during which Judge Hyde had the case under 
advisement, he did not have access to Exhibits D-14, D-15 and D-16. 
THE COURT: Let the Supreme Court decide. My record 
shows that they were offered and admitted, but 
not utilized in chambers. Thatfs what her minute 
sheet shows and she is very careful about her 
minutes. 
(R. 585 ) 
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Exhibits D-14, D-15 and D-16 are important to the 
decision in this action because they show the location of the 
Weber River drawn across the SW% of Section 25, and the 
relation of the location of the subject property to the 
entire river flow and point out the fact that the subject 
property was in Davis County in 1866. 
Inasmuch as Judge Hyde in his Memorandum Decision and 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law indicated that 
he was persuaded in making his decision by the fact that 
there had not been a prior survey of the river, a careful 
inspection of the three Exhibits would hardly support the 
following statement excerpted from Judge Hyde's Memorandum 
Decision: 
There being no prior surveys of the river itself, 
to place the river in a location other than the 
1894 survey is just speculation. 
(See prior Brief of Plaintiffs-
Addendum III-- and R. 488) 
If the legislature of the Territory of Utah had felt that 
the line between the two counties should have been established 
by a metes-and-bounds survey, it could have done so, partic-
ularly since the area had been surveyed as early as 1855. In 
any event, the law is very clear that the channel of the Weber 
River is a suitable legal description, such descriptions are 
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commonplace, and plaintiffs have found no law to the contrary. 
Inasmuch as UDOT's counsel removed the critical Exhibits 
and thus made it impossible for Judge Hyde to have had them 
available in making his decision, to support the Judgment in 
this matter would infringe upon the guarantees of due process and 
equal protection of the laws afforded by the Federal Civil Rights 
Act (premised upon violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution) and Article I, Section VII of the Constitution 
of Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
The subject property was on the Davis County side of the 
Weber River as of January 10,1866; accordingly, the Davis County 
tax sale proceedings were valid and title to the subject property 
should be quieted in plaintiffs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLEN E. FULLER 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
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